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DUTY OF CANDOR IN THE DIGITAL AGE: THE NEED FOR 




Cell phones and other mobile devices have radically trans-
formed our world.2 In fact, cell phone technology is the “most quickly 
adopted consumer technology in the history of the world,” and the 
number of cell phone users worldwide increases every year.3 Today, 
ninety-one percent of adults in the United States own a cell phone.4
Many users constantly check their phones, keep them by their bed-
sides at night, and use them in connection with virtually every daily 
activity.5 This “nearly ubiquitous mobile connectivity” means that 
almost every American citizen is constantly connected to the global 
mobile network.6
Little do they know, however, that law enforcement officers now 
use Stingrays7—or International Mobile Subscriber Identity (“IMSI”) 
catchers—to mimic a wireless carrier’s base station and “trick” cell 
phones into connecting to it.8 These devices track the location of 
suspected criminals and gather evidence against them by sending 
electronic signals to all cell phones within the device’s vicinity in 
1. Student, Chicago-Kent College of Law
2. See generally Lee Rainie, Cell Phone Ownership Hits 91% of Adults, PEW RESEARCH 






7. “Stingray” is the brand name for the IMSI-catcher product manufactured by the Harris 
Corporation. Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, A Lot More Than a Pen Register, and 
Less Than a Wiretap: What the StingRay Teaches Us About How Congress Should Approach 
the Reform of Law Enforcement Surveillance Authorities, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 134, 146 n.35 
(2013). This Comment will use the term “Stingray” to refer generally to IMSI-catcher technolo-
gy.
8. ADRIAN DABROWSKI ET AL., SECURE BUS. AUSTRIA RESEARCH, IMSI-CATCH ME IF YOU 






      12/28/2015   14:43:02
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 155 Side B      12/28/2015   14:43:02
11 HEMMER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/10/2015 11:23 AM
296 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 91:1
order to trigger an automatic response from each phone.9 Stingrays 
are also capable of “hijacking” a targeted mobile device—performing 
“silent calls,” calling or texting on behalf of the targeted cell phone, 
and changing the content of text messages sent from the cell 
phone.10
With the emergence of this cutting-edge police technology, we
should be particularly vigilant about the potential for abuse. The “mil-
itarization” of the police as part of the War on Drugs provides a cau-
tionary tale regarding the devastating effect that overzealous 
policing can have on privacy.11 In 1990 the 101st Congress enacted 
the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),12 and section 1208 
of the Act allowed the Secretary of Defense to transfer military-grade 
weapons and ammunition to state and local police departments to 
combat the War on Drugs.13 The result of the 1208 program was 
that the number of paramilitary police raids conducted on the private 
residences of civilians nationwide increased from approximately 
3,000 in 1980 to 45,000 in 2001.14 There was also a 292 percent 
increase in the number of police departments deploying SWAT team 
units against citizens from 1982 to 1997.15 Also, many police de-
partments nationwide have deployed these quasi-military tactics 
against citizens who turn out to be innocent of any crime. A study 
conducted by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in twenty-
six states during 2011 and 2012 found that up to sixty-five percent of 
SWAT deployments for drug searches turned up no contraband of 
any kind.16
Stingrays present a similar threat to the privacy of individuals 
that are innocent of any crime. Through the use of Stingray technol-
ogy, law enforcement agencies are now capable of ascertaining the 
precise location of millions of cell phone users across the country, 
intercepting the content of those phones and manipulating their op-
9. Id.
10. Active GSM Interceptor, ABILITY, http://www.interceptors.com/intercept-
solutions/Active-GSM-Interceptor.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2015).
11. See generally RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF 
AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES 137–284 (1st ed. 2014). 
12. H.R. Res. 2461, 101st Cong. (1990) (enacted).
13. H.R. Res. 2461, supra note 12, at § 1208.
14. BALKO, supra note 11, at 221.
15. Id.
16. KARA DANSKY ET AL., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE 
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erations at will.17 The frightening capabilities of Stingray devices 
implicate serious Fourth Amendment concerns. The Fourth Amend-
ment protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures,18
and without proper judicial oversight, Stingray use in many cases 
will be unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The first federal district court case to address the constitutional 
implications of Stingray use, United States v. Rigmaiden, is still pro-
ceeding in the District Court of Arizona.19 The judge in that case 
recently issued a detailed order denying the defendant’s motion to 
suppress evidence seized by the use of a Stingray.20 However, in 
that case, the government failed to specify the technology that it 
intended to use in executing the search warrant, leaving out crucial 
details related to the device’s invasiveness and likely impact on third 
parties.21
This Note proposes a different approach than the one taken in 
Rigmaiden and advocates a new standard of judicial supervision of 
Fourth Amendment searches in the context of Stingray technology. 
Given the enormous power that Stingray technology gives the police 
to spy on American citizens, the judiciary must hold law enforcement 
to a heightened “duty of candor”22 in search warrant applications 
involving this specific technology. In addition, magistrate judges 
should follow certain guidelines in issuing search warrants involving 
Stingray use in order to mitigate the impact on the privacy of third 
parties.
Part II of this Note will detail the operational capabilities of 
Stingrays and highlight the grave societal concerns that the devices 
raise. Part III will discuss Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the 
digital age and argue that Stingray use constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search. It will also analyze United States v. Rigmaid-
en23 and a particularly relevant case involving a search warrant for 
electronic data, United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 
17. ABILITY, supra note 10.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. United States v. Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Ariz. 2012).
20. Order Denying Motion to Suppress, United States v. Rigmaiden, No. CR 08–814–
PHX–DGC, 2013 WL 1932800, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013).
21. [Proposed] Brief for American Civil Liberties Union & Electronic Frontier Foundation 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant, United States v. Rigmaiden, 2013 WL 1932800, at 
*14 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013) (No.904-3) [hereinafter Rigmaiden Brief].
22. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1178 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
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Inc.,24 with an emphasis on Chief Judge Kozinski’s concurrence.25
Part IV will advocate a two-fold proposal for the issuance of search 
warrants involving Stingray technology. First, the judiciary must re-
quire government officials to include in warrant applications a de-
tailed description of the technology and its capabilities. This 
additional information will allow magistrates to impose appropriate 
limitations on the scope and execution of the warrant and to mitigate 
the impact on the privacy of third parties. Second, magistrates 
should impose the following specific limitations and conditions26 on 
Stingray warrants: (1) government officials must waive reliance on 
the plain view doctrine; (2) segregation and redaction of electronic 
data must be done by specialized law enforcement personnel not 
involved in the investigation, and those personnel must not disclose 
to the investigators any information other than that which is the tar-
get of the warrant; (3) the government’s search protocol must be 
narrowly tailored to uncover only the information for which it has 
probable cause, and agents may examine that information only; and 
(4) the government must immediately destroy any intercepted third-
party data without examining its contents. This two-part proposal will 
enable magistrates to ensure that Stingray warrants do not become 
de facto “general warrants” effectively nullifying Fourth Amendment 
protections. Part V will discuss and respond to potential criticisms of 
this solution.
II. OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES OF THE STINGRAY
Stingrays are used in mobile cell phone networks to “identify 
and eavesdrop” on cell phones.27 Cell phones connect to the global 
network through a wireless carrier’s base station, and a Stingray is 
designed to mimic a base station and “trick” cell phones into con-
necting to it.28 Stingrays emit a stronger frequency signal than wire-
less carrier base stations, and thus “exploit [a cell phone’s] behavior 
to prefer the strongest cell phone tower in [its] vicinity.”29 Technology 
companies in the United States, including the Harris Corporation, 
24. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d 1162. 
25. Id. at 1178 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
26. See generally id. at 1178–1180.
27. DABROWSKI ET AL., supra note 8.
28. Id.
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offer Stingrays for purchase by law enforcement agencies.30 The 
Harris Corporation’s Stingray device is available for a base price of 
roughly $75,000.31 The devices were originally designed simply to 
steal IMSI numbers32 from phones, which allows authorities to iden-
tify the phone number associated with each particular cell phone 
and track the location of each cell phone within a few meters.33
However, more recent versions offer call and message interception 
features, along with features allowing the interception of data and 
content, including emails.34 For example, the Harris Corporation 
offers an “Intercept Software Package” as a supplement to its Sting-
ray product.35
The operational capabilities of the Stingray device should be 
troubling to all citizens, not just those involved in criminal activity. 
First, the use of Stingrays impacts countless numbers of innocent 
third parties, not just the target of an investigation.36 A Stingray 
sends electronic signals to all of the cell phones within its vicinity 
and triggers an automatic response from each cell phone.37 This 
“dragnet sweep of third-party information”38 enables law enforce-
ment to track the location and intercept the data of all the individuals 
within a range of “several kilometers.”39 In other words, by use of a
Stingray, law enforcement can invade the privacy of potentially 
thousands of innocent parties in the pursuit of often a single individ-
ual suspected of criminal activity. The devices also drain the battery 
30. Id.; Letter from Lin Vinson, Major Account Manager, Harris Corp., to Raul Perez, City 
of Miami PD (Aug. 25, 2008) (on file at 
http://egov.ci.miami.fl.us/Legistarweb/Attachments/48003.pdf).
31. HARRIS GCSD PRICE LIST, HARRIS CORP. WIRELESS PRODS. GRP. (2008) (on file at 
http://info.publicintelligence.net/Harris-SurveillancePriceList.pdf).
32. An IMSI number is a unique number, usually fifteen digits, associated with Global 
System for Mobile Communications (GSM) and Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
(UMTS) network mobile phone users. The IMSI number identifies a GSM subscriber. It is 
stored in the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) inside the phone and is sent by the phone to 
the appropriate network. The IMSI number is used to acquire details about the mobile in the 
Home Location Register (HLR) or the Visitor Location Register (VLR). See Cory Janssen, 
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), TECHOPEDIA,
http://www.techopedia.com/definition/5067/international-mobile-subscriber-identity-imsi (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2005).
33. DABROWSKI ET AL., supra note 8.
34. Id.
35. HARRIS GCSD PRICE LIST, supra note 31.
36. Rigmaiden Brief, supra note 21, at 10.
37. DABROWSKI ET AL., supra note 8.
38. Rigmaiden Brief, supra note 21, at 10.
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of the affected third-party cell phones and disrupt their network con-
nectivity.40
Second, Stingrays connect to third-party cell phones in the 
same manner as a network carrier’s base station, and thus the de-
vices necessarily send signals into private areas including homes, 
offices, and the like.41 This means that the government can ascer-
tain a cell phone user’s location and activity not just in areas acces-
sible to the public, but in areas that are supposed to provide optimal 
privacy and personal autonomy.42 Further, Stingrays can “pinpoint 
an individual with extraordinary precision, in some cases ‘within an 
accuracy of 2 m[eters].’”43 Thus, not only can the police know which 
private residence a cell phone user is occupying, but which room of 
that private residence, and indeed what specific two-meter area of 
that room.44 This leads to an unsettling realization: Stingrays give 
government officials the ability to track your movements and activity 
twenty-four hours a day wherever you are; there is no longer any 
realm of personal privacy from the government to which a citizen 
can retreat.
Precise movement tracking is a concerning feature of the Sting-
ray. All individuals have sensitive personal information that they 
seek to keep private, even in public spaces. Supreme Court Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor explained this fact thoroughly in her concurrence 
in United States v. Jones, a case involving GPS monitoring of the 
defendant’s car.45 Precise movement tracking of a person’s cell 
phone, like the defendant’s car in Jones, “generates a precise, com-
prehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a 
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, 
and sexual associations.”46 Information disclosed by precise move-
ment tracking of an individual’s cell phone will reveal trips of an inti-
mately private nature: “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, 
the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the 
40. Julian Dammann, IMSI-Catcher and Man-in-the-Middle Attacks, Presentation at the 
Seminar on Mobile Security at the Univ. of Bonn (Feb. 9, 2011) (on file at http://cosec.bit.uni-
bonn.de/fileadmin/user_upload/teaching/10ws/10ws-sem-mobsec/talks/dammann.pdf).
41. See, e.g., What You Need to Know About Your Network, AT&T,
http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=14003 (last visited Oct. 31, 2015).
42. See generally id.
43. Rigmaiden Brief, supra note 21, at 11 (citing PKI ELEC. INTELLIGENCE GMBH GER.,
GSM CELLULAR MONITORING SYSTEMS (2010) (citation omitted). 
44. See id.
45. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, 
the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar” and so on.47 The 
government can then store these records and “efficiently mine them 
for information years into the future.”48
While Justice Sotomayor highlights how deeply troubling pre-
cise movement tracking is in itself, the chilling fact is that the Sting-
ray’s operational capabilities go much further.49 One technology 
company describes the functionalities of its Stingray product by stat-
ing that “[t]he user can control the level of service to the target mo-
biles, selectively Jam50 specific mobiles, perform silent calls, call or 
SMS on behalf of target mobile, change SMS messages . . . and 
many additional operational features.”51 Technology companies that 
offer Stingray products typically sell the “base” model by itself, which 
is capable of ascertaining a mobile device’s IMSI number and cell 
phone number and tracking the device, and sell the “add-ons” allow-
ing for the more alarming functions separately.52 Also, data encryp-
tion software does not protect a smartphone user from a Stingray’s 
“state-of-the-art” attack: current models “allow for a timely decryption 
and key recovery.”53 The operational capabilities of the Stingray 
clearly underscore the extreme intrusiveness involved in law en-
forcement’s use of the device to investigate criminal activity and 
highlight the need for heightened judicial supervision of Stingray 
searches.
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE DIGITAL AGE
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states:54
47. Id. (quoting Weaver, 882 N.Y.S.2d at 909).
48. Id. at 955–56 (citing United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 
2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
49. DABROWSKI ET AL., supra note 8.
50. “Jamming” refers to a multi-faceted technique that includes preventing the mobile 
device from making or receiving calls, text messages, and emails; preventing the mobile from 
connecting to the Internet via Wi-Fi; and preventing the mobile’s GPS unit from receiving 
correct positioning signals. See GPS, Wi-Fi, and Cell Phone Jammers: Frequently Asked 
Questions (FAQs), FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N ENF’T BUREAU, transi-
tion.fcc.gov/eb/jammerenforcement/jamfaq.pdf (last updated Oct. 9, 2015).
51. ABILITY, supra note 10 (alteration in original).
52. See, e.g., DABROWSKI ET AL., supra note 8; ABILITY, supra note 10; Lin Vinson, supra
note 30; HARRIS GCSD PRICE LIST, supra note 31.
53. See DABROWSKI ET AL., supra note 8.
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.
Since the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme 
Court has developed an extensive and complicated set of jurispru-
dential rules interpreting its text.55 An understanding of the origins of 
the Fourth Amendment will help to put the Court’s jurisprudence in 
context.
A. Origins of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment was a “cause and a product of the 
American Revolution,” and the Framers enacted it as a safeguard 
against what they considered to be one of the most profound evils 
perpetrated by the English Crown against the colonists: unreasona-
ble searches and seizures.56 Under English rule, colonial represent-
atives of the Crown regularly executed general search warrants, 
called “Writs of Assistance,” which authorized officials to “go into any 
house, shop, cellar, warehouse or room, or other place, and in case 
of resistance, to break open doors, chests, trunks and other pack-
ages” to search for and seize any “prohibited” items.57 No factual 
basis was required to justify these intrusions; British officials were 
free to rummage through any privately owned property that they 
wished to search.58
The framers responded to this tyrannical practice by enacting 
the Fourth Amendment, which was designed to prevent similar 
abuses in the new American nation.59 The amendment safeguards 
the civil liberties of American citizens by ensuring that the govern-
ment may only obtain a search warrant upon a showing of probable 
cause and every government search must be reasonable whether or 
not conducted pursuant to a warrant.60
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B. Modern Interpretation
The Supreme Court has developed a comprehensive and de-
tailed interpretation of the Fourth Amendment since its enactment.61
In Katz v. United States, the Court established the current test that 
states that a search occurs where governmental officials intrude on 
an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”62 In order for an 
individual’s expectation of privacy to be afforded constitutional pro-
tection, two prongs must be satisfied: (1) the individual must exhibit 
an actual, subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) that expectation 
must be “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasona-
ble.’”63 More recently, in United States v. Jones, the Court explained 
that Katz “did not narrow the Fourth Amendment’s scope,” and in-
stead supplemented the existing property-based Fourth Amendment 
rule: when the government engages in “physical intrusion of a con-
stitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intru-
sion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”64
Although the Court has maintained that a search is “presumptively 
unreasonable” in the absence of a warrant, the true test is whether a 
search is reasonable. For this reason, the Court has found many 
types of warrantless searches to be reasonable.65
The Court also requires that all searches be supported by ade-
quate “probable cause.”66 The Court has defined probable cause as 
existing “where ‘the facts and circumstances within their (the offic-
ers’) knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy in-
formation (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being 
committed.”67 The probable cause requirement “seek[s] to safeguard 
citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and 
from unfounded charges of crime”68 by limiting baseless searches 
unsupported by adequate facts. Magistrates are vested with a vital 
constitutional responsibility in the issuance of search warrants to 
determine that all aspects of the search are supported by probable 
61. See generally id.
62. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 361. 
64. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012) (quoting United States v. Knotts, 
460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
65. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360.
66. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949).
67. Id. at 175 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).





      12/28/2015   14:43:02
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 159 Side B      12/28/2015   14:43:02
11 HEMMER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/10/2015 11:23 AM
304 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 91:1
cause.69 Magistrates also have a duty to impose appropriate limita-
tions and conditions on the scope and execution of warrants, and 
police officers must “execute the warrant as directed by its terms.”70
Next, the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant “particular-
ly describe both the place to be searched and the person or things 
to be seized.”71 The particularity requirement “prevents general, ex-
ploratory searches and indiscriminate rummaging through a per-
son’s belongings.”72 It also ensures that the issuing magistrate is 
“fully apprised of the scope of the search.”73Magistrate judges have 
a duty to impose limitations on the scope of a search and seizure “in 
order to prevent an overly intrusive search.”74 In Dalia v. United 
States,75 the Court held that the Fourth Amendment warrant re-
quirement necessitates only three things: (1) issuance by a de-
tached and neutral magistrate; (2) probable cause; and (3) a 
particular description of the things to be seized and the place to be 
searched.76 However, some courts and commentators have also 
recognized a “duty of candor” owed by government agents in pre-
senting warrant applications to judicial officers.77 This duty requires 
the government to fairly disclose the scope of the intended search, 
including the likely impact on third parties. A lack of candor in any 
aspect of the warrant application “must bear heavily against the 
government in the calculus of any subsequent motion to return or 
suppress the seized [items].”78 The rationale behind the duty is that 
a magistrate cannot faithfully perform his vital constitutional function 
if the government withholds material information relating to the 
scope of the search.79 A reviewing court, in deciding whether an 
executed search exceeded the scope authorized in the warrant, 
looks to “the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the warrant, 
69. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 263 (1983).
70. Id. at 262. 
71. United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. United States v. Rettig, 589 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1978).
75. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
76. Christina M. Schuck, Note & Comment, A Search for the Caselaw to Support the 
Computer Search “Guidance” in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 16 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 741, 774 (2012) (citing Dalia, 441 U.S. at 255)).
77. United States v. CDT, 621 F.3d 1162, 1178 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., concur-
ring).
78. Id. (alteration in original).
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and the circumstances of the search.”80 Certainly, when a court ana-
lyzes a search based on the “totality of the circumstances”81 sur-
rounding the search, the impact on third-party privacy should be 
considered.
Finally, of particular relevance here is the “plain-view” doc-
trine.82 The plain view doctrine provides that when the police have a 
warrant to search a given area for specified items, and “in the 
course of the search [they] come across some other article of incrim-
inating character,” they are authorized to seize that item.83 The 
Court has established three conditions that must be satisfied to justi-
fy warrantless seizure under the plain view doctrine: (1) the item 
must be in plain view of the officer; (2) its incriminating character 
must be “immediately apparent”; and (3) the officer must have a 
lawful right of access to the object itself.84 This doctrine elicits dan-
gerous possibilities in the context of Stingray use. Unless magis-
trates impose proper limitations on the use of this device, the police 
may sift through thousands of third-party emails, text messages and 
phone calls in the pursuit of a single suspect.85 Furthermore, there is 
nothing to prevent police officers or federal agents from “seizing” 
and reviewing ostensibly “incriminating” data from third parties not 
the subject of investigation and using that information against them.
C. Application in the Digital Age
The complex set of rules developed since the enactment of the 
Fourth Amendment have proved difficult for courts to apply in a con-
sistent manner, and the emergence of advanced digital technology 
has further clouded the issue. Courts face significant challenges in 
attempting to apply the text of an amendment designed to prevent 
governmental intrusion into houses, shops, and cellars86 to cell 
phones, computers, and other digital devices. The emergence of 
these technologies has resulted in situations implicating Fourth 
Amendment concerns that were beyond the imagination of the 
Framers of the Constitution.
80. United States v. Hurd, 499 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
81. United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
82. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1990).
83. See id. at 136 (alteration in original). 
84. Id. at 136–37. (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971).
85. See DABROWSKI ET AL., supra note 8.
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1. Stingray Use Constitutes a Fourth Amendment Search
The first question that arises in the context of new technologies 
like the Stingray is whether the use of the technology at issue consti-
tutes a “search” for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The 
Supreme Court has decided a number of cases that raised this 
question in the context of other technologies, and Congress has 
enacted legislation that attempts to address the issue of law en-
forcement’s use of certain advanced technology. In Smith v. Mary-
land, a case decided in 1979, the Court held that the installation and
use of a pen register,87 a device designed to record the numbers 
dialed from the defendant’s phone, was not a “search” that required 
a warrant.88 The Court reasoned that because the defendant volun-
tarily turned over the numbers that he dialed to a third party (the 
telephone company) he did not have a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” in those numbers.89
Congress responded to the Court’s decision in Smith by enact-
ing the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).90
The Act established a number of regulations designed to make elec-
tronic surveillance laws uniform, and it included the “pen/trap” provi-
sions that addressed law enforcement’s use of pen registers.91 The
so-called “Pen Register Statute” made it unlawful for the government 
to use a pen register to gather evidence in an investigation without 
first obtaining a court order based upon a showing that the infor-
mation likely to be obtained through surveillance of the target phone 
is “relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.”92 Fifteen years 
later, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act,93 and one provision 
of the Act amended the definition of a “pen register” to make it more 
87. A “pen register” is a mechanical device attached to a telephone line and installed at a 
central telephone facility. It functions by recording on a paper tape all phone numbers dialed
from that phone line. It does not identify the telephone numbers from which incoming calls 
originate, nor does it reveal whether any call, incoming or outgoing, was completed success-
fully. It does not involve any monitoring of telephone conversations. See United States v. 
Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 549 n.1 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting in part).
88. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979).
89. Id. at 744.
90. H.R. Res. 4952, 99th Cong. (1986) (enacted).
91. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (1986).
92. See, e.g., In re Application of the United States for an Order for Disclosure of Tele-
comm. Records and Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace, 405 F. Supp. 
2d 435, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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encompassing.94 Due to this amendment to the Pen Register Stat-
ute, law enforcement agencies have been able to convince some
magistrates to issue court orders under the statute for the use of 
Stingrays.95 However, the Pen Register Statute should not even 
apply to Stingrays. The amended definition of a “pen register” under 
the statute describes it as “a device . . . [that] records or decodes 
dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information . . . .”96 The 
Stingray does not fit this definition: the base model including only the 
most limited functions includes precise location tracking and the 
ability to ascertain the phone number and IMSI number of a cell 
phone.97 Also, the Pen Register Statute requires that the order state 
“the number and, if known, physical location of the telephone line” 
that the pen register is to be attached to.98 However, in the context 
of Stingrays and other digital analyzers, the telephone number and 
location of the phone typically will not be known at the time that an 
order is issued, and thus “it would be impossible to comply literally 
with the requirements of § 3123(b)(1)(C).”99 For these reasons, an 
order issued pursuant to that statute is insufficient to justify the use 
of a Stingray.100
Further, unlike pen registers, Stingray use constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search, which requires a showing of probable cause 
and a warrant. In Kyllo v. United States101 the Court held that police 
officers’ use of thermal imaging technology to detect heat levels 
from the defendant’s home was a search because the technology 
94. The amended definition states: “the term ‘pen register’ means a device or process 
which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by 
an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provid-
ed, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication, but 
such term does not include any device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire or 
electronic communication service for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for commu-
nications services provided by such provider or any device or process used by a provider or 
customer of a wire communication service for cost accounting or other like purposes in the 
ordinary course of its business;” 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).
95. See, e.g., In re Application of the United States for an Order, 433 F. Supp. 2d 804 
(S.D. Texas 2006).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (alteration in original).
97. DABROWSKI ET AL., supra note 8.
98. In re Application of United States for an Order Authorizing Use of a Cellular Tele-
phone Digital Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. 197, 200 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 
3123(b)(1)(C)).
99. Id. at 201.
100. See In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation 
and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747, 752 (S.D. Tex. 
2012).
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allowed the police to obtain information that could not otherwise be 
obtained without “intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.”102
The Court limited its holding in that case as applicable where “the 
technology in question is not in general public use.”103
Like the thermal imaging device in Kyllo, a Stingray sends sig-
nals that penetrate the walls of a home, which allows the police to 
obtain information about the suspect that they could not obtain oth-
erwise without intruding into the home itself.104 Under this analysis, 
use of a Stingray to monitor phones in public areas ostensibly would 
not constitute a Fourth Amendment search; however, when a Sting-
ray is deployed it affects all cell phones within an area of “several 
kilometers,”105 and it is reasonable to assume that at least some of 
those affected cell phones will be inside private residences. Also, 
the Stingray cannot plausibly be characterized as being “in general 
public use.”106 Stingray manufacturers typically offer the device ex-
clusively to police departments and federal law enforcement agen-
cies through vendor letters sent directly to those agencies, and even 
a “base” model Stingray costs about $75,000, which is likely too 
expensive for most members of the general public to purchase.107
Interestingly, in Rigmaiden the government stipulated to the fact that 
it conducted a Fourth Amendment search when it used a Stingray to 
ascertain the defendant’s location inside his apartment.108 Thus, the 
government “acknowledged that the proper analysis [for Stingrays] 
had to be pursuant to Fourth Amendment search and seizure juris-
prudence.”109
In Riley v. California, the Court indicated that examining the 
contents of a person’s cell phone constitutes a Fourth Amendment 
102. Id. at 34; see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (holding that 
installation of an electronic monitor on a can of ether taken into the defendant’s residence 
constituted a Fourth Amendment search).
103. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
104. Id.; AT&T, supra note 41; see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 
(2012) (holding that the government’s installation and monitoring of a GPS device on sus-
pect’s vehicle constituted a search due to “physical intrusion” for the purpose of obtaining 
information).
105. DABROWSKI ET AL., supra note 8.
106. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
107. See, e.g., DABROWSKI ET AL., supra note 8; ABILITY, supra note 10; Lin Vinson, supra
note 30; HARRIS GCSD PRICE LIST, supra note 31.
108. United States v. Rigmaiden, No. CR 08–814–PHX–DGC, 2013 WL 1932800, at *15 
(D. Ariz. May 8, 2013) (citing Government Doc. 723 at 13–14). 
109. In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation and 
Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747, 752 (S.D. Tex. 2012) 
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search.110 Riley held that the police officer’s warrantless search of 
the contents of the defendant’s phone was unreasonable, and it 
could not be justified by the “search incident to arrest” exception.111
That exception allows the police to make a limited warrantless 
search of the arrestee’s person and the area within the arrestee’s 
immediate control following a lawful, custodial arrest.112 Because the 
government did not contest that examining a phone’s content is a 
search, the Court assumed without deciding that in this case exam-
ining the contents of the defendant’s phone constituted a Fourth 
Amendment search.113
Thus, under Riley,114 use of a Stingray’s “add-on” features that 
allow for software content interception115 also constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search. Like the police officer examining the contents of 
the defendant’s phone in that case, Stingrays allow police officers to 
examine the contents of cell phones remotely, and thus intrude on 
cell phone users’ reasonable expectations of privacy in a similar 
manner as the police officer in that case.116
Although there have been a number of cases decided regarding 
what constitutes a “search” in the digital age, there is scant case law 
addressing the warrant requirements applicable to searches involv-
ing electronic data and Stingrays. However, one important case was 
recently decided in the Ninth Circuit and another case is currently 
pending in the District Court of Arizona, both of which will be dis-
cussed below.
2. The Stingray Examined: United States v. Rigmaiden
The first federal district court case to address the constitutional 
implications of Stingray searches, United States v. Rigmaiden, is 
currently pending in the District Court of Arizona.117 In Rigmaiden,
the government indicted the defendant, Daniel Rigmaiden, on sev-
enty-four counts of mail and wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, 
110. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014).
111. Id. at 2484–85. 
112. Id. at 2490–94. 
113. Id. at 2482.
114. Id. at 2485.
115. See DABROWSKI ET AL., supra note 8.
116. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482; DABROWSKI ET AL., supra note 8.
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and conspiracy.118 The defendant allegedly perpetrated a scheme to 
obtain fraudulent tax refunds by filing electronic tax returns in the 
names of hundreds of deceased persons and third parties.119 The 
government located the defendant by tracking the location of an 
aircard120 in his possession. The defendant and the ACLU argued 
that the technology used by the government—Stingray technology—
violated his Fourth Amendment rights even though the government 
obtained a warrant to use the technology.121
The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained 
through use of the Stingray, and the ACLU and the Electronic Fron-
tier Foundation (EFF) filed an amici curiae brief in support of his 
motion.122 They argued that the government’s Stingray search ex-
ceeded the scope of the warrant issued in the investigation of Mr. 
Rigmaiden.123 The warrant directed Verizon Wireless to provide the 
government with information and assistance in tracking the defend-
ant, but “nowhere authorize[d] the government to search or seize 
anything.”124 The warrant application also failed to describe the 
technology that the government planned to use, and only made 
fleeting references to a “mobile tracking device.”125 The application 
also implied that Verizon would operate the device and turn the in-
formation it gathered over to government agents.126 The district 
court concluded that the Stingray surveillance was not outside the 
scope of the warrant, although it conceded that the so-called “Track-
ing Warrant” was “not a model of clarity.”127
The defendant and the ACLU also argued that because Sting-
rays are a “new and potentially invasive technology,” the govern-
ment was required to describe the technology in detail in the warrant 
application.128 The court conceded that the government failed to 
118. Order Denying Motion to Suppress, United States v. Rigmaiden, No. CR 08–814–
PHX–DGC, 2013 WL 1932800, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013).
119. Id.
120. An aircard is a wireless adapter for cellular data; also called a “cellular modem,”
“data card,” “3G modem,” or “4G modem.” Definition of: Air Card, PCMAG,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/59687/air-card (last visited Sept. 17, 2015). 
121. Rigmaiden, 2013 WL 1932800, at *1.
122. Id. at 14.
123. Id.
124. Rigmaiden Brief, supra note 21, at 12 (alteration in original).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 13. 
127. Order Denying Motion to Suppress, United States v. Rigmaiden, No. CR 08–814–
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alert the magistrate to the privacy implications for third parties that 
use of the Stingray would involve, stating, “the application did not 
disclose that the mobile tracking device would capture signals from 
other cell phones and aircards in the area of Defendant’s apart-
ment.”129 However, the court quickly disposed of this issue by re-
garding it as a “detail of execution” which need not be specified.130
Further, the court contended that the government’s omissions impli-
cated only the question of “how the search would be conducted,” 
and were not material to the probable cause determination.131 In 
conclusion on this point, the court considered it relevant that the 
warrant did not explicitly authorize the government to retain and 
review intercepted third-party data.132
The district court in Rigmaiden underestimated the potential for 
abuse of Stingray technology by police, and overestimated the wis-
dom of allowing government agents to set restrictions on their own 
search warrants, instead of requiring those decisions to be made by 
a judicial officer. The court failed to recognize the fundamental as-
pect of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that states that decisions 
regarding the limitations on a search warrant are to be made by neu-
tral, detached magistrates, not by police officers involved in the “of-
ten competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”133 For example, 
the court suggests that the lack of a specific provision in Stingray 
warrants authorizing the government to retain and review intercept-
ed third-party data will result in the government refraining from doing 
so.134 While this certainly may be true in some cases, it is not a re-
assuring safeguard against privacy intrusions to allow the govern-
ment to make these determinations. A “neutral and detached 
magistrate”135 must make the decisions regarding how a Stingray 
search is to be executed and how third-party data will be handled, 
not police officers and other government agents. The emergence of 
Stingray technology necessitates a new standard for search war-
rants imposing affirmative requirements on law enforcement and 
putting the decisions regarding limitations and conditions of the war-
rants in the hands of magistrate judges, not police officers.
129. Id. at 20.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 21 (quoting United States v. Mittelman, 999 F.2d 440, 444 (9th Cir. 1993).
132. Id. at 22.
133. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
134. See Rigmaiden, 2013 WL 1932800, at *19.
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3. Guidelines to Follow: United States v. Comprehensive Drug 
Testing, Inc. 
In a case decided in 2010,136 the Ninth Circuit strongly empha-
sized the need for heightened judicial supervision of searches in the 
context of evolving technology, “where the danger of overly intrusive 
searches and seizures is acute.”137 Specifically, the court addressed 
the “procedures and safeguards that federal courts must observe in 
issuing and administering search warrants” for electronic data.138
The case involved a federal investigation into the Bay Area Lab 
Cooperative (BALCO), which the government suspected of providing 
steroids to professional baseball players.139 Comprehensive Drug 
Testing, Inc. (CDT) administered a Major League Baseball program 
that provided for suspicionless drug testing of all players, and main-
tained a list of players tested and their respective test results.140
During the investigation, the government learned of ten players who 
had tested positive for steroid use.141 Federal authorities subse-
quently obtained a warrant in California authorizing the search of 
CDT’s facilities in Long Beach, and the warrant was limited to the 
records of the ten players as to whom the government had probable 
cause.142 The magistrate who issued the warrant granted “broad 
authority for seizure of [electronic] data,” including a large volume of 
computer equipment, data storage devices, manuals, logs, and oth-
er materials.143 However, the warrant also contained “significant 
restrictions on how the seized data were to be handled,” designed to 
ensure that the investigators would not examine data beyond the 
scope of the warrant.144 Despite these restrictions, when the agents 
executed the search warrant they seized and reviewed electronic 
drug testing records of hundreds of players and many other innocent 
clients of CDT.145 CDT and the Players Association moved for the 
return of the property seized, and the reviewing judge found that the 
 136.  United States v. CDT, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 137.  Rigmaiden Brief, supra note 21, at 14. 
 138.  CDT, 621 F.3d at 1165–66. 
 139.  Id. at 1166. 
 140.  Id.
 141.  Id.
 142.  Id.
 143.  Id. at 1168. 
 144.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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government had failed to comply with the procedures specified in 
the warrant and ordered the property returned.146
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed with the lower court 
and affirmed its order, emphasizing the “threat to the privacy of in-
nocent parties” from an investigation involving electronic data like 
the one in this case.147 The court was troubled by two constitutional 
problems that an opposite holding would cause: (1) broad authoriza-
tion for law enforcement to examine electronic records would create 
a risk that every warrant for electronic data would become a de facto
general warrant; and (2) authorizing the government to sift through 
third-party electronic data in the search for a suspect’s data without 
judicial restraint would allow the government to claim that a third 
party’s data is in “plain view” and, if incriminating, would allow the 
government to retain it.148
Chief Judge Kozinski wrote a concurring opinion in the case,149
and that opinion is particularly relevant to Stingray searches. The 
Chief Judge agreed with the court’s holding, but wrote a separate 
opinion in order to provide guidance to magistrates about how to 
deal with search warrants for electronic data.150 The guidelines that 
he set forth are as follows: (1) the government must waive reliance 
upon the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases; (2) segrega-
tion and redaction of electronic data must be done either by special-
ized government personnel or an independent third party, and those 
personnel must not disclose to investigators any data other than that 
which is the target of the warrant; (3) warrants must fairly disclose 
the risks of destruction of information; (4) the government’s search 
protocol must be designed to uncover only the information for which 
it has probable cause; and (5) the government must destroy the 
non-responsive data collected from third parties.151
These recommendations by the Chief Judge are sensible guide-
lines designed to protect third=party privacy, and they are applicable 
and adaptable to Stingray searches. First, the electronic data seized 
in CDT included electronic directories and drug testing records cop-
146. Id.
147. See id. at 1175.
148. Id. at 1176.
149. Id. at 1178.
150. Id.
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ied from CDT’s computers,152 and Stingrays are capable of inter-
cepting electronic content like that seized in CDT.153 Next, 
“smartphones” function similarly to desktop computers; “the main 
difference is that one is portable and the other is not.”154 Finally, the 
main concern surrounding Stingray data interception is similar to 
that implicated by the electronic data search in CDT: Stingrays allow 
authorities to “sift through” third-party cell phone data the same way 
that the government sifted through third-party electronic records in 
CDT.155
The Chief Judge also discussed the government’s “duty of can-
dor” in submitting warrant applications and affidavits, emphasizing 
the vital importance of this duty in the context of electronic data 
searches.156 In CDT, the government presented a warrant applica-
tion that outlined theoretical risks that data might be destroyed if the 
warrant did not grant broad seizure authority.157 However, the appli-
cation failed to mention that CDT had pledged to keep all data intact 
until the Northern California District Court ruled on its motion to 
quash the subpoena.158 The government’s omission “created the 
false impression that, unless the data were seized at once, it would 
be lost.”159 Chief Judge Kozinski proceeded to state that “omitting 
such highly relevant information altogether is inconsistent with the 
government’s duty of candor in presenting a warrant application,” 
and that the government should be held to a stricter duty of candor 
in the context of electronic data searches.160 Similarly, the govern-
ment must be held to a stricter duty of candor in the context of Sting-
ray searches in order to allow magistrates to evaluate all the 
information material to the search warrant, including the capabilities 
of the device and the likely impact on third parties, so that the mag-
istrate can impose appropriate limitations on the execution and 
scope of the warrant.
152. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 513 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 
2008).
153. See DABROWSKI ET AL., supra note 8.
154. John C. Dvorak, Should We Consider the Smartphone a Computer?, PCMAG (Dec. 
4, 2012, 3:34 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2412850,00.asp.
155. See DABROWSKI ET AL., supra note 8; CDT, 621 F.3d at 1166, 1176.
156. CDT, 621 F.3d at 1162, 1178. 
157. Id.
158. Id.
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IV. PROPOSAL FOR HEIGHTENED WARRANT REQUIREMENTS IN THE 
CONTEXT OF STINGRAYS
Because law enforcement’s use of Stingrays to conduct Fourth 
Amendment searches presents an increased risk of abuse and is 
especially intrusive, there is a need for heightened judicial supervi-
sion of Stingray searches. The appropriate solution involves a two-
fold proposal for the issuance of search warrants involving Stingray 
technology. First, magistrate judges must require government offi-
cials to include in warrant applications and affidavits a detailed de-
scription of the technology and its capabilities in order to allow 
magistrates to impose appropriate limitations on the scope and exe-
cution of the warrant to mitigate the impact on the privacy of third 
parties. Second, magistrates should impose the following specific 
limitations and conditions on Stingray warrants: (1) government offi-
cials must waive reliance on the plain view doctrine; (2) segregation 
and redaction of electronic data must be done by specialized gov-
ernment personnel not involved in the investigation, and those per-
sonnel must not disclose to the investigators any information other 
than that which is the target of the warrant; (3) the government’s 
search protocol must be narrowly tailored to uncover only the infor-
mation for which it has probable cause, and agents may examine 
that information only; and (4) the government must immediately de-
stroy all intercepted third-party data without examining its con-
tents.161 These guidelines for the issuance of search warrants 
involving Stingray use will serve to protect innocent third parties 
from unreasonable governmental intrusion on their privacy and, 
most significantly, will prevent law enforcement from abusing this 
incredibly powerful technology.
A. “Duty of Candor” Requirement
The first part of this two-fold proposal is that judicial officials 
must require government agents to include in warrant applications 
and affidavits a detailed description of the technology it plans to use 
and its capabilities in order to allow magistrates to impose appropri-
ate limitations on the scope and execution of the warrant. Law en-
forcement’s description of the Stingray and its capabilities should be 
detailed enough to allow the magistrate to get a general idea of how 
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the technology works, how the government plans to use it, what 
functions of the device it plans to employ, and the general geograph-
ic and temporal parameters that will be implicated by the govern-
ment’s use of the device. This requirement could be satisfied by law 
enforcement attaching the device’s manual as an exhibit and then 
describing in sufficient detail which functions it plans to employ and 
where and for how long it will employ them.
It is particularly important for the government to be candid to-
wards magistrates in the context of Stingray warrant applications 
because Stingray manufacturers typically sell the base model by
itself, and sell the “add-ons” allowing much more intrusive functions 
separately.162 That means that even if law enforcement states in the 
warrant application that it intends to use a Stingray in executing the 
warrant, magistrates cannot be certain what functions the govern-
ment intends to employ unless that information is included in the 
application. Whether law enforcement intends to employ only the 
“base” model of a Stingray, or one or more of the offered “add-ons,” 
can make a radical difference in the scope of the search.163 For ex-
ample, if a law enforcement agency intends to use only the base 
model Stingray, the agency will only be able to utilize the device’s 
more limited functions, including ascertaining the target phone’s 
IMSI number and phone number and precisely tracking the 
phone.164 However, if the government plans to use one or more of 
the typical supplements to the base model, it may be able to “jam” 
the target phone, perform silent calls or send text messages on be-
half of the target phone, or change the content of text messages, 
phone calls, or emails sent to and from the target phone.165 There-
fore, in order for magistrates to be confident that they are fully ap-
prised of the scope of the intended search, the government must 
make clear which company’s Stingray product it intends to use, how 
it intends to use it, and which functions it intends to employ.
The government’s candor in this regard will allow magistrates to 
fully examine the scope of the intended search and impose sensible 
limitations and conditions on its scope and execution. Depending on 
the facts and circumstances of the particular case, the magistrate 
162. See, e.g., DABROWSKI ET AL., supra note 8; ABILITY, supra note 10; Lin Vinson, supra
note 30; HARRIS GCSD PRICE LIST, supra note 31.
163. See generally id.
164. See DABROWSKI ET AL., supra note 8.
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will be able to limit the scope of the intended search by conditioning 
the issuance of the search warrant on the government’s pledging to 
only use certain functions of the Stingray. Also, by the government 
disclosing the intended geographical scope of the search, the mag-
istrate will be able to estimate the number of third-party devices that 
will be affected and thereby impose appropriate conditions regarding 
the government’s handling of this wealth of third-party information. 
The government’s candor towards magistrate judges in submitting 
search warrant applications for Stingray use is vitally important to 
the magistrate’s faithfully executing his or her constitutional role, and 
will allow magistrates to impose specific limitations and conditions 
on the scope and execution of the search.
B. Specific Limitations and Conditions on Stingray Search War-
rants
The second part of the two-fold proposal is that magistrates 
should impose specific limitations and conditions on Stingray search 
warrants. These limitations and conditions include the following: (1) 
government officials must waive reliance on the plain view doctrine 
in Stingray cases; (2) segregation and redaction of electronic data 
must be done by specialized law enforcement personnel not in-
volved in the investigation, and those personnel must not disclose to 
the investigators any information other than that which is the target 
of the warrant; (3) the government’s search protocol must be nar-
rowly tailored to uncover only the information for which it has proba-
ble cause, and agents may examine that information only; and (4) 
the government must immediately destroy any intercepted third-
party data without examining its contents.166 These limitations and 
conditions provide sensible methods of ensuring that law enforce-
ment does not abuse the incredible power that Stingrays allow for, 
and will allow magistrates to retain their vital constitutional role as 
the supervisors of Fourth Amendment searches. Each of these four 
limitations and conditions involve different concerns, and thus each 
will be discussed separately in turn.
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1. Government Must Waive Reliance on the Plain View Doc-
trine
The first of these four conditions is that magistrates should re-
quire the government to waive reliance on the plain view doctrine in 
Stingray cases. The plain view doctrine is an exception to the war-
rant requirement that states that when the police have a warrant to 
search a given area for specified items, and “in the course of the 
search come across some other article of incriminating character,” 
they are authorized to seize and retain that item.167 The plain view 
doctrine is particularly relevant in the context of Stingray searches 
because when the government deploys a Stingray, it may sift 
through thousands of third-party emails, text messages, and phone 
calls unrelated to the investigation.168 Therefore, if during the course 
of a Stingray search government agents come across third-party
data of “incriminating character,” they would apparently be author-
ized to retain that data and use it against that third party.
It should be made clear, however, that the plain view doctrine 
“has no application to intermingled private electronic data.”169 The
plain view doctrine is commonly applied to justify warrantless sei-
zures in cases where a police officer had a prior justification for the 
intrusion “in the course of which he came inadvertently across a 
piece of evidence incriminating the accused.”170 However, in Sting-
ray searches and other searches involving large volumes of inter-
mingled private electronic data, often the evidence that police will 
come across will be evidence incriminating someone other than the 
accused, i.e., a third party. In this context, allowing the government 
to rely on the plain view doctrine would essentially allow it to search 
the data of all cell phones within a large vicinity with no prior justifi-
cation needed other than the warrant obtained authorizing it to 
search for a single suspect. Therefore, magistrates should insist that 
government officials waive reliance on the plain view doctrine in 
Stingray searches. This will ensure that Stingray searches do not 
167. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135 (1990).
168. See DABROWSKI ET AL., supra note 8.
169. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 513 F.3d 1085, 1117 (9th Cir. 
2008) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
170. United States v. McLevain, 310 F.3d 434, 439 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Coolidge v. 
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make a “mockery” of the Fourth Amendment “by turning all warrants 
for digital data into general warrants.”171
2. Segregation and Redaction of Third-Party Data
The second condition that magistrates should impose on Sting-
ray warrants is to require that specialized law enforcement person-
nel not involved in the investigation segregate and redact all third-
party data, and that those personnel not disclose to the investigators 
any information other than that which is the target of the warrant.172
This is another sensible safeguard that will prevent investigating 
agents from collecting or reviewing third-party data and thus protect 
innocent third parties from the search. To accomplish this objective, 
the issuing magistrate should include in the warrant a protocol for 
preventing agents involved in the investigation from examining or 
retaining any third-party data.173 The issuing judicial officer should 
prohibit the specialized law enforcement officers reviewing the data 
from communicating to the investigating agents any information oth-
er than that covered by the warrant itself.174 This requirement is 
necessary due to the extremely large volume of third-party data that 
will inevitably be collected by a Stingray.175
3. The Government’s Search Protocol Must Be Narrowly Tai-
lored
Next, magistrates should require the government’s search pro-
tocol to be narrowly tailored to uncover only the information for 
which it has probable cause, and require that agents examine that 
information only.176 This narrow tailoring includes the segregation 
and redaction procedures discussed above, and also includes how 
the government plans to use the Stingray, where it plans to use it, 
how long it plans to use it, and which (if any) “add-on” features it 
plans to use. Depending on the facts and circumstances of the par-
ticular case, the issuing magistrate should require the government to 
only utilize the features of the Stingray that are necessary to accom-
plish the objective of the warrant. For example, if the search warrant 
171. See CDT, 621 F.3d at 1178 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
172. See id.
173. See id. at 1179.
174. See id.
175. See DABROWSKI ET AL., supra note 8.
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authorizes the government to use the Stingray only to ascertain the 
location of the suspect, the government should only utilize the 
“base” model Stingray, which allows for precise movement track-
ing.177 If, on the other hand, the warrant authorizes the government 
to “search” the suspect’s phone remotely for emails, text messages, 
or phone calls, the government may use certain “add-ons” allowing 
for those capabilities.178
4. Destruction of Intercepted Third-Party Data
The final condition that magistrates should impose on Stingray 
search warrants is that, following segregation and redaction of third-
party data, the specialized government personnel must immediately 
destroy any non-responsive third-party data intercepted during the 
search without revealing its contents to the investigating agents.179
This will ensure that the government’s search does not reveal any 
data that is not connected to the subject of the investigation and will 
preserve the privacy of innocent third parties. To that end, the gov-
ernment should also provide the issuing magistrate with a return 
“disclosing precisely what it has obtained as a consequence of the 
search,” as well as a “sworn certificate that the government has de-
stroyed . . . all copies of [third-party] data that it’s not entitled to 
keep.”180
These four conditions and limitations provide sensible methods 
by which magistrates judges can ensure that the government does 
not abuse the highly advanced technological capabilities involved 
with Stingrays. Without these limitations, the government could use 
a warrant authorizing them to search for a single individual’s mobile 
data to canvass the mobile data of entire cities’ populations. There-
fore, this proposal ensures that the judiciary will be able to properly 
supervise Stingray searches and the government will not be allowed 
to abuse Stingray technology in criminal investigations.
V. RESPONSE TO POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THIS PROPOSAL
One potential criticism of this proposal could be that the solution 
is too complicated and will be difficult to implement. First, the re-
177. See DABROWSKI ET AL., supra note 8.
178. See id.
179. See CDT, 621 F.3d at 1180 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
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quirement that law enforcement adhere to a duty of candor in pre-
senting Stingray warrant applications should not be too difficult to 
follow. Technology companies that sell Stingrays to law enforcement 
agencies also send vendor letters, product descriptions, price lists, 
and technology manuals directly to those agencies.181 The compa-
nies that offer Stingrays to law enforcement include descriptions of 
the product and its capabilities, as well as a description of each of 
the supplements to the product.182 In order for the government to 
satisfy the first requirement of this two-fold proposal, it would be 
sufficient for it to attach to warrant applications as exhibits the prod-
uct manual and the product descriptions sent to them by these vari-
ous technology companies. Therefore, it should be practicable for 
the government to satisfy this requirement without expending much 
time or effort. Also, the list of suggestions for magistrates to follow in 
issuing Stingray search warrants is similarly practicable. Magistrates 
often impose limitations and conditions on search warrants, and 
these limitations and conditions are not unreasonable.
Another potential criticism of this solution could be that it is in-
consistent with existing laws. In particular, the requirement that the 
government narrowly tailor its search protocol is most vulnerable to 
this criticism. As discussed above in Part III(B), in Dalia v. United 
States, the Supreme Court rejected an argument that was based 
partly on the fact that the magistrate in that case did not explicitly 
authorize the particular search protocol employed by the govern-
ment.183 There, the Court held that under the Fourth Amendment, 
warrants must meet only three requirements: (1) issuance by a de-
tached and neutral magistrate; (2) probable cause; and (3) a particu-
lar description of the things to be seized and the place to be 
searched.184 The Court further explained, “it is generally left to the 
discretion of the executing officers to determine the details of how 
best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized by war-
rant.”185 While this is certainly a valid criticism, Stingray searches 
involve different concerns than most other searches. Due to the ex-
tremely broad scope of Stingray searches, it is necessary to require 
the government to include a search protocol in its warrant applica-
181. See e.g., DABROWSKI ET AL., supra note 8; ABILITY, supra note 10; Lin Vinson, supra
note 30; HARRIS GCSD PRICE LIST, supra note31.
182. See, e.g., HARRIS GCSD PRICE LIST, supra note 31.
183. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979).
184. Shuck, supra note 76, at 774 (citing Dalia, 441 U.S. at 255).
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tions. Also, the proposition that search warrant applications should 
include a search protocol, especially where electronic data is in-
volved, is not without support.186 Ultimately, however, this Comment 
proposes a substantive change to the existing law limited to Stingray 
search warrants due to the extremely heightened broadness and 
intrusiveness involved in such searches.
Finally, another potential criticism of the proposed solution is 
that it will be too expensive to implement effectively. As explained 
above, technology companies directly send all the information that 
police would need to present to magistrates regarding the opera-
tional features of Stingrays.187 Therefore, presenting this information 
to a magistrate would involve negligible cost to law enforcement. 
Also, the requirement that police departments and federal law en-
forcement agencies have specialized personnel review the data 
could be met simply by the agency assigning officers already em-
ployed by that agency to review the data, which likely would not in-
volve additional cost. Finally, the cost of a base model Stingray is 
around $75,000,188 and thus if the government is prepared to shoul-
der the cost of a Stingray, it should be prepared to shoulder the neg-
ligible additional costs that go along with using it responsibly.
Overall, although there is some merit to each of the potential 
criticisms of the proposed solution, its benefits outweigh its potential 
drawbacks. The protection of the Fourth Amendment rights and 
basic civil liberties of citizens and the reaffirmation of magistrates as 
the supervisory authority of Fourth Amendment searches is worth 
the potential costs that the proposed solution could involve.
VI. CONCLUSION
The vast majority of United States citizens own a cell phone, 
and many people’s cell phones contain intimate details concerning 
their private and personal lives. Stingrays allow the government to 
track citizens’ every movement and examine the contents of their 
cell phones. This technology has the potential to be a very effective 
186. See In re Search of: 3817 W. West End, First Floor Chi., Ill. 60621, 321 F. Supp. 2d 
953, 959–61 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (refusing to issue a warrant that did not include a computer 
search protocol); United States v. Barbuto, No. 2:00CR197K, 2001 WL 670930, at *5 (D. Utah 
2001) (suppressing documents seized from the defendant’s computer because agents did not 
present a search methodology).
187. See, e.g., DABROWSKI ET AL., supra note 8; ABILITY, supra note 10; Lin Vinson, supra
note 30; HARRIS GCSD PRICE LIST, supra note 31.
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law enforcement tool, but it also has the potential to infringe our 
basic civil liberties on a nationwide scale. This Comment does not 
suggest that Stingrays should not be used by law enforcement at all, 
but simply that magistrate judges should be vested with the authority 
to effectively supervise their use. This proposal will likely have an 
impact on the ability of law enforcement to combat crime—”[p]rivacy 
comes at a cost.”189 The Supreme Court has long recognized this 
basic “truism”: “[C]onstitutional protections have costs.”190 The price 
is worth paying to restore and protect the liberties that we fought the 
Revolutionary War to gain.191 Therefore, there is a heightened need 
for judicial supervision of Stingray searches in order to safeguard 
the liberties that the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect. 
The judiciary must hold law enforcement to a heightened “duty of 
candor” in submitting search warrant applications involving Sting-
rays, and magistrate judges should follow strict guidelines in issuing 
Stingray warrants. Stingrays involve technology that was beyond the 
imagination of the Framers of the Constitution. In order to remain 
faithful to their intent, our system of jurisprudence and law enforce-
ment must evolve to meet the concerns of the present day, including 
the dangerous technology that Stingrays involve.
189. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014). 
190. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988).
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